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Transfer of Space Technology to the American
Consumer: The Effect of NASA's Patent Policy*
Samuel I. Doctorst
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year the Federal Government now spends more for
research and development... than it did in all the years from
the time of the Revolution through the end of World War H....
But never... has so much money been spent by the Gov-
ernment with so little consideration for its ultimate social and
economic consequences .... Billions of dollars go for research
but mere fractions of mills for putting the product of this large
scale inquiry to the good of the society at large.'
* Prepared under the sponsorship of the New England Research
Application Center, a NASA Regional Dissemination Center, with the
assistance of Michael Moore, LL.B. 1967, Harvard. The views expressed
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the
sponsoring organization.
t Consultant, New England Research Application Center.
1. Report on Economic and Legal Problems of Government Patent
Policies for the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on
Small Business, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963).
In fiscal 1966 the federal government financed at least $15.9 billion
of research and development, or about 70% of the total research and
development in the country. 15 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, FEDERAL
FUNDs FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPmENT, AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC AcTIVmEs 5
(1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 NSF REPORT].
If research and development plant and technical data activities are
included, the National Science Foundation data indicates that a total of
$17.6 billion was spent in research and development related activities.
In 1940, 0.8% of the total federal budget was spent on science and tech-
nology, while in fiscal 1966 it is estimated that 15% of the total federal
budget was spent on science and technology.
Even the $17.6 billion figure probably considerably understates fed-
eral spending for extramural research and development. The major
procurement agencies fund a considerable amount of research and de-
velopment through reimbursement of corporate spending for "inde-
pendent research and development," "product improvement," and "bid-
proposal" costs. The amount may be as high as 5% of contractor sales
to the federal government. The percentage is based not on the worth
of the research and development contract, but on a percentage of total
procurement sales to the federal government including research, devel-
opment, and production. Hearings on S. 789, 1809, 1899 Before the Sub-
Comm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 400 (1965). The funding is
negotiated with the particular agency or service that is the largest cus-
tomer and is added to allowable overhead rates. See ASPR § 15-205
(Nov. 1963, rev. 3); NASA PR § 15.205-35 (Nov. 1965, rev. 6).
It is very difficult to obtain reliable, accurate data as to the amounts
actually paid to contractors for this in-house, indirectly funded research
and development, since the total amount expended by any given com-
pany for independent research and development, product improvement,
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During the past several years there has been a growing
realization in this country that more should be done to promote
the utilization by other segments of the economy of technology
developed by federal agencies and their industrial partners.2
With the formation of a large-scale national space program
under the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), particular concern has been expressed over the con-
finement of a very large portion of the nation's scientific and
technical resources within just three mission-oriented federal
agencies-the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC), and NASA.3 Assuming that for the foreseeable
future the major portion of government sponsored research and
development will continue to be conducted by these three agen-
cies, the question of how to enhance technology transfer from
the space-defense sector to other technologically advanced por-
tions of the economy becomes very important.
The AEC and NASA have undertaken formal programs
aimed at promoting the transfer of technology developed as a
result of government sponsored research and development to
and bid-proposal funds is considered highly proprietary. Government
participation may run up to 80% or 90% of the total cost with the bal-
ance being funded from corporate "profits."
In fiscal 1962, this overhead funding was running at a rate of about
4.5% of the total Department of Defense procurement or about $0.9
billion.
The significance of this overhead research and development funding
is that it apparently represents a significant share of all research and
development spending attributed to private companies working for the
Department of Defense and NASA. Yet private research and develop-
ment funding is often cited as the reason for granting to federal con-
tractors rights to patentable items discovered in the course of federal
contract work and for minimizing their responsibility to report infor-
mation not specifically required to fulfill the given contract. Even when
reported the information is often limited in distribution and availability.
Solo, Studies in the Anatomy of Economic Progress 258-80 (1965)
(working paper prepared for the National Planning Association).
Whether such overhead research and development funding is con-
sidered public or private, the policies associated with its use may need
to be reexamined in light of their implications for overall economic
progress rather than solely in light of the narrow mission objectives of
the Department of Defense. See notes 33 & 42 infra.
2. See generally Hearings on Federal Research and Development
Programs Before the House Select Comm. on Government Research, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Re-
organization and Internal Organization, Co-ordination of Information
on Current Federal Research and Develonment Projects in the Field of
Electronics, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
3. The Department of Defense, NASA, and the AEC procure over
85% of the federal government's research and development. See 1966
NSF REPORT, supra note 1.
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sectors of the economy outside the space-defense milieu. On
the other hand, the Department of Defense has sought to
minimize disclosure of research and development results thereby
hindering any such transfer.4 Although the application of much
of the research and development performed under the auspices
of these three agencies may be limited to the immediate tech-
nological application,5 nevertheless, as long as the bulk of the
research and development resources of this country are expended
by these three federal agencies, methods of improving their rates
of technology transfer to other sectors should be investigated.
Because a full blown analysis of technology transfer in the fed-
eral agency setting is beyond the scope of this Article, attention
will be directed only to the influence that a government agency's
patent policy may have on the transfer of technology developed
by that agency.6 While patentable items form only a small por-
4. Solo, supra note 1, at 280. The Department of Defense has been
primarily concerned with its mission goals and has paid little attention
to the possibility of economic gain from technology transfer, assuming
that its contractors would commercialize as much of their work product
as they thought appropriate. Since Department of Defense procurement
dwarfs all other science agency budgets, it is likely that the Department's
policies play a large role in influencing contractor reaction to NASA's
attempts to establish a program for transfer.
5. Considerable doubt exists as to whether space-defense research
and development has much potential value to the civilian economy. See,
e.g., A.D. LITTLE, INC., TRANSFER OF AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED
STATEs-A CRITICAL REVIEW (1966) (Report to the Subcomm. on Tech-
nology of the Comm. of Enquiry Into the Aircraft Industry, U.K.) One
cannot be certain because measurement of success in transferring tech-
nology has proven to be an intractable problem. See DENVER RESEARCH
INsTITUTE, THE COMMERCIAL APPLICATION OF MISSILE/SPACE TECHNOLOGY
(Sept. 1963); LESHER & HOwIcK, ASSESSING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
(NASA SP-5067, 1966); NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION, THE IMPACT
OF THE U.S. CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM ON THE U.S. DOMESTIC ECONOMY
(Washington, D.C., July 1965).
The best available estimates of specific innovations reaching the
civilian economy range from 7% to 13% of the total government
financed, patented innovations. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm, of the Ju-.
diciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-29, 86-129 (1960) (7%); Holnan, Govern-
ment Research and Development Inventions-A New Resource?, 41 LAND
ECON. 231 (1965) (10%); Watson, Bright & Burns, Federal Patent Policies
in Contracts for Research and Development, 4 IDEA 295 (1960) (13%).
It has also been argued that not only has military-generated tech-
nology been of limited use to the civilian economy, but that the transfer
of technology from the space-defense sector is growing more difficult
than it was in the days of simpler weapon systems. Solo, Gearing
Military Research and Development to Economic Growth, 1962 HARv.
Bus. REV. 49.
6. Some indication of the disparity between the total amount of
technology available for transfer and the number of patentable items
1968]
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tion of the total technology developed by an agency, their trans-
fer is more easily measured than that of nonpatentable tech-
nology since these items are well documented and their use can
be more readily traced. This element of measurable feedback
is most important in evaluating any program of technology trans-
fer, since so little is presently known about the actual process
of transfer.7
Broadly speaking, a patent policy may influence a technol-
ogy transfer program in one of two alternative ways. A liberal
or "license" patent policy-one that allows government contrac-
tors to retain title to all or most patentable inventions discovered
in the course of government sponsored research and develop-
ment-may act as an incentive to ccntractors to disclose inven-
tions to the government. The rationale behind such a policy is
that, if a contractor knows that he will obtain patent rights to
his innovation, he will report it so that he may reap the patent-
monopoly profits. Such reporting may be termed the "input"
function in a technology transfer program. On the other hand,
a "strict title" policy-one in which the government retains title
to any patentable inventions-frees the device for all to use,
since government-held patents are generally available for licens-
ing to all.8 The rationale behind the "strict title" policy is that
if no one has a right to exclude others, the technology will be as
widely disseminated as possible. This may be termed patent
policy's influence on the "output" function in a technology trans-
fer program.
This is admittedly a highly simplified conceptualization,
but it serves to illustrate the basic tension in the relationship of
patent policy to technology transfer: the greater the patent
incentive provided to contractors to disclose new innovations,
necessarily the less available the device will be for transfer.
Of course, if an inventor-contractor himself commercially de-
velops the device to which he was accorded the patent rights, he
is given by comparing the total number of disclosures to the number of
patent applications which have been filed. From 1958 through 1966,
8,065 items had been disclosed by NASA contractors. Of these, 737 (or
less than 10%) had patent applications pending or had been granted
patents. NASA employees during the same period disclosed 2,154 items,
and 817 (or about 35%) had patent applications pending or had been
granted patents. NASA, A REVIEw OF NASA's PATENT PROGRAMA (1967).
Thus, about 15% of the specific item disclosures fall within the patent
license ambit.
7. See generally ROSENBLOOm, TECmOLOGY TRAISFEa-PRocEss AND
POLICY (1965).
8. See Tektronix Inc. v. United States, 351 F.2d 630 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
[Vol. 52:789
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bypasses the technology transfer system in the sense that he
transfers the device to another sector within his own company.
Hence, it may be argued that not only does the contractor-take-
all policy encourage reporting, but also that it makes elaborate
systems to transfer technology unnecessary, since the contractor
himself will commercially apply the device. However, the ex-
perience of the government indicates that freely giving contrac-
tors patent rights to inventions is not a significant element in
motivating utilization.9 Therefore, it would seem that agency
policy should not favor the contractor-inventor in the grant of
patent rights unless the contractor is able to demonstrate intra-
company utilization.
Since NASA's policies present the best current example of
an attempt to reconcile the basic tension described, its patent
policy has been chosen for discussion. NASA, among all fed-
eral agencies, has devised such a policy not only because it is
one of the three largest research and development sponsoring
agencies, but also because, outside of the Department of Agri-
culture, it has the most ambitious program of any government
agency for the dissemination of technology.10 NASA's formal
program, the NASA Technology Utilization Program, affects both
the acquisition (input function) and the dissemination (output
function) of technology generated by NASA sponsored research
and development." NASA's patent policies are an integral part
of both functions of this program.
II. PATENT POLICY AND THE INPUT FUNCTION
A. ADVANCE WAIVERS UNDEa TmE SPACE ACT
Before technology developed under a government contract
can be transferred it must be reported to the sponsoring govern-
ment agency. Beginning in 1962 NASA inserted in its research
and development contracts a "New Technology Clause" requiring
the reporting to NASA of any innovation developed in the
9. See notes 42-54 infra and accompanying text.
10. Most other agencies with "dissemination programs" merely
maintain a library type of operation. The larger exceptions, aside from
NASA, are the AEC's Industrial Cooperation Program aimed at promot-
ing civilian use of atomic energy and the State Technical Services
Program of the Department of Commerce, which was recently initiated
to promote the more widespread use of new technology.
11. The Technology Utilization Program is administered by the
NASA Office of Technology Utilization through its Regional Dissemina-
tion Centers.
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course of research and development work.12  Beyond the con-
tractual obligation to report imposed on contractors by this
clause, NASA has attempted to encourage reporting by waiving
its patent rights to any innovation to contractors who apply for
such waivers. Current NASA regulations permit three types of
waiver: (1) a blanket waiver prior to contract initiation;13 (2)
a blanket waiver within sixty days of the execution of the con-
tract;14 (3) a waiver for particular innovations after they have
been identified and reported.15
The congressional mandate for such waiver authority, it is
argued, may be found in section 305 (a) of the Space Act,' 6
which provides that inventions made by NASA contractors in
the course of their work "shall be the exclusive property of
the United States . . ." unless the Administrator waives the
government's rights. Section 305 (f) states that the Adminis-
trator
may waive all or any part of the rights of the United States
under this section with respect to any invention or class of
inventions made or which may be made by any person or class
of persons . . . if the Administrator determines that the inter-
ests of the United States will be served thereby.1
However, there is considerable dispute' s over just what policy
Congress had in mind when it passed section 305. One study has
concluded that Congress neither intended presumptively to vest
12. NASA PR § 9.101-4 (1966). Section 305(b) of the Space Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2457(b) (1964), requires that such clauses be inserted in
NASA research and development contracts. NASA's original clause
was patterned after similar sections of Armed Services Procurement
Regulations § IX (now § 9.200, April 1965, rev. 10).
13. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.104(a) (1967).
14. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.105(a) (1967).
15. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.106(a) (1967).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2457(a) (1964).
17. Id. § 2457(f).
18. Compare the agency statement in NASA, A REVIEW Or NASA's
PATENT PROGRAM 13 (1966), with the comments of Senators Morse and
Long in Hearings on S. 789, 1809, 1899 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess.; pt. 1, at 329-83 (1965); See also Hearings on the Impact
of Government Patent Policies on Economic Growth, Scientific and
Technological Progress, Competition, Monopoly, and Opportunities for
Small Business Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Select Comm. on Small
Business, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1963), where Senator Morse com-
mented:
Congress has seriously considered this matter. In 1958 when
it passed the Space Act, it provided in section 305 that the
Government was to take title to these patents, except in the
unusual and exceptional case. ...
NASA was apparently unhappy with this congressional
policy, however. Twice it sought changes in section 305 to
[Vol. 52:789
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title in the government nor presumptively to waive title; but
rather intended to provide for a "flexible" policy.19 This seems
to indicate that Congress preferred to leave detailed elaboration
to the Administrator.
One may refer to the words "or class of inventions made or
which may be made . . ." in section 305 for support of the Ad-
ministrator's authority to grant blanket waivers in advance of
the identification of any particular invention. However, a "class
of inventions" does not necessarily mean any invention which
may occur in the course of a large government sponsored re-
search project. The words "which may be made" are certainly
not conclusive either, since Congress could have been referring
to inventions which might be made after the Act was passed.
NASA has also relied in part on the President's Patent Policy
Statement of 196320 for its rights to grant blanket waivers. It
was asserted there that where the subject matter of the contract
is within "an area in which the contractor has an established
nongovernmental commercial position, the contractor shall nor-
mally acquire the principal or exclusive rights throughout the
world in and to any resulting inventions ... ."-" Although this
statement by inference appears to contemplate blanket waivers
of title at or before contract initiation, any reliance by NASA
on it is ill-founded. 22 Clearly such a statement of policy made
come closer to the Defense Department's policy of handing over
exclusive patent rights on taxpayer-financed research and de-
velopment to the private contractor. Both attempts failed.
Now, it is clear, NASA is trying to circumvent the clear Con-
gressional mandate of section 305 by an administrative regula-
tion.
19. Aaronson, Legislative History of the Property Rights in Inven-
tions Provisions of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, in
WATSON & HOLMAN, EVALUATION OF NASA's PATENT POLICIES, app. A
(Geo. Wash. Univ. 1966) [hereinafter cited WATSON & HOLMAN].
20. See 14 C.F.R. § 1245.104(a) (6) (1967), quoting in part the
language of the Presidential Patent Policy statement, quoted in text
accompanying note 21 infra; NASA, A REviEw OF NASA's PATENT
PROGRAM 16-27 (1967).
21. Statement of Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943,
10,945 (1963).
22. In attempting to devise a consistent if nonuniform government
patent policy, the statement contemplates three different situations: 1)
cases where the best interests of the public would be served by retention
of exclusive rights in the government; 2) cases "where the purpose of
the contract is to build upon existing knowledge or technology . . . "
in which case the contractor should be allowed the patent, and 3) cases
"where the commercial interests of the contractor are not sufficiently
established to be covered by . . . [2] above, [in which cases] the de-
termination of rights shall be made by the agency after the invention
has been identified. . . ." 28 Fed. Reg. at 10,945 (1963). By implication,
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by the executive to all government agencies in general is not
very persuasive of congressional intent with regard to a particu-
lar agency such as NASA.
23
Whether or not NASA has the authority to grant advance
waivers is less significant than the effect of the inadequate
congressional guidelines on agency administration of patent regu-
lations. On the one hand, NASA continually seeks to convince
its congressional critics that, while its promulgated regulations
may appear unduly liberal, there is in practice little deviation
from an AEC-type 24 practice. 25 On the other hand, it seeks to
convince contractors that its blanket waiver provisions are an im-
portant incentive to report their inventions to NASA. Main-
tenance of this dual policy has apparently failed to achieve ei-
ther objective. 26
B. ADvANcE WAnmRs, WAIVERS, AND LIcENSES AS INCENTIVES
To REPORT
The justification for the granting of advance waivers is that
they "create a positive and selfserving incentive for the con-
tractor to prepare and submit . . .reports" 27 thereby creating
an input into NASA's technology bank for its Technology Utiliza-
tion Program. However, the same can also be said for waivers
granted on particular inventions after they have been identified
because the contractor will be motivated to report by the be-
lief that he will receive a waiver. NASA's guarantee of an ir-
revocable, nonexclusive, royalty-free license to any contractor
blanket disposition of government rights in advance of identification is
contemplated in category (2).
23. In addition, waiver of these patent rights by NASA is arguably
a "disposal of property" within art. IV, § 3 of the United States Constitu-
tion. See notes 90-94 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of
this issue. If this is the case, only Congress can authorize such waivers.
24. The AEC retains title to nearly all of the innovations spawned
by its research and development funds.
25. Examples of this dual policy may be found by contrasting the
official NASA annual review, A Review of NASA's Patent Program
for 1967, with a statement delivered to NASA contractors by NASA's
Chief Patent Counsel, Robert F. Allnutt, (Feb. 1966). At page 28, the
former document states that
Of all contractor inventions reported, commercial rights have
been waived in less than 4% of the cases, and advance waivers
have been granted or recommended in only 118 contracts out
of almost 13,200 contracts and subcontracts awarded by NASA
since the advance waiver policy was established....
However, these low percentages are due to the fact that few contractors
apply for waivers. Of those who do apply, 81% obtain regular waivers,
and 42% receive advance waivers. See note 28 infra.
26. See note 18 supra.
27. NASA, A REVIEW OF NASA's PATENT PROGRAM 22 (1967).
[Vol. 52:789
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who reports an innovation which is eventually patented 2s is also
considered an incentive to report. The rationale here is that so
long as the contractor knows that he can use the device, he
will not be deterred from disclosing it.
However, none of these incentives appears to have had any
noticeable effect on contractor reporting. Initially it should
be noted that the number of patent applications arising out of
government financed research and development is generally
much smaller than the number of such applications generated
by private research and development in the same research area.
One study comparing research and development in electronics
capital goods done for the Department of Defense, with pri-
vately financed research and development in that field, showed
that a billion dollars of privately financed research and develop-
ment yielded about 9,000 patent applications, while a billion
dollars of government financed research and development yielded
only about 760 patent applications.29
In addition, there is no apparent correlation between present
agency patent policies and disclosure rates. The Department of
Defense, which allows its research and development contractors
to take title to all innovations, has both the highest disclosure
rate-the Navy with 1,653 disclosures per billion dollars of re-
search and development-and almost the lowest-the Air Force
with 657 disclosures per billion dollars.30 The AEC, which re-
tains title to almost all patents on contractors' inventions, has
one of the highest disclosure rates, 1,613 disclosures per billion
dollars,31 while NASA, with a fairly liberal patent policy, is near
the bottom with 610 disclosures per billion dollars.3 2 However,
28. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.113 (1967).
29. Freeman, Research and Development in Electronics Capital
Goods, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE EcoNomvcs Rmvnw 73 (1965). While lack
of motivation in carrying an idea through to the point of commercial
practice may account for much of this discrepancy, lack of reporting
must also be a substantial factor.
30. FEDERAL COUNCIL FOR ScIENcE AND TECHNOLOGY, ANNUAL REPORT
ON GOVERNMENT PATENT PoLicy 25-37 (1966) (these figures are for fiscal
1965).
31. See id.
32. WATSON & HOLMAN 34. However, NASA's disclosure rate has
been rising:
Estimated Extramural
Research and Development
Contractor Expenditures Disclosures
Year Disclosures in billions per billion
1964 1203 3.107 400
1965 2094 3.429 630
1966 3310 4.20 788
Total 6607 10.736 Average: 620
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with the sole exception of NASA, whose present policies have
been operative only since 1964,33 these agencies have not estab-
lished or administered patent policies with a view to maximizing
transfer. Rather, they have established them to fulfill the mis-
sion requirements of each agency.
NASA's lower rate of reporting might be accounted for by
the rapid initiation of its program, its esoteric technology, its
emphasis on increments in precision rather than on new devices,
and its highly mission-oriented research and development. But
if explanations are to be sought in the peculiar nature of NASA
research and development, it must be noted that NASA con-
tractors disclose significantly less often than do NASA employ-
ees.34 NASA contractors, however, have probably done more of
the basic construction work (out of which few innovations would
come) than have NASA employees.
In addition, seventy per cent of NASA's research and de-
velopment funds are spent on the Apollo program for which
North American Aviation is the largest prime contractor.35 While
prime contractors are obligated to impose the New Technology
Clause on first tier subcontractors, there is no provision of pen-
alties for lack of compliance by subcontractors, nor does the
prime contractor have any incentive to enforce the clause against
his subcontractors. By contracting for so much of its research
and development through Apollo, and most of that through one
large prime contractor, NASA probably has a greater propor-
tion of its work done by the less reporting-oriented subcon-
tractors than either of the other agencies.
Whatever the causes of NASA's peculiarly low rate of re-
porting, the important fact is that agency patent policy has
33. The Department of Defense has long been indifferent to con-
tractor reporting, receiving less than 40% of the reports that are by-
products of its research and development programs. THE PRESIDENT'S
SCIENCE ADVISORY CoMMITTEE, SCIENCE, GOVERNMENT, AND INFORMATION
(Jan. 10, 1963) (commonly known as the Weinberg Report). Because
NASA contractors are often also contractors with the Department of
Defense, the impact of NASA's uniquely heavy emphasis on contractor
reporting may have been diluted by contractor inertia.
34. Professor Solo found that for the period 1958-1965, NASA em-
ployees reported nearly twice as many inventions per employee as did
contractors' employees (where "employee" was defined as being a
scientist or engineer). On the other hand, for 1965 itself, the rate of
reporting was about equal. Solo, Invention Under NASA-Sponsored
Research and Development 14 (1966) (part II of a working paper for
NASA). The Watson and Holman conclusions are similar. WATSON &
HOLMAN 35-36.
35. 1966 NSF REPORT supra note 1, at 3.
[Vol. 52:789
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been virtually irrelevant to the reporting function. The hy-
pothesis that granting patent rights to a contractor will lead
him to report is not supported by available data. Actually con-
tractors are relatively indifferent to whether or not patent
rights are granted. 36 In the contract negotiation process, the
price does not appear to be dependent upon whether a waiver of
patent rights is granted. Moreover, few NASA contractors
have ever bothered to apply for waivers, either in advance of
contract execution or after a particular device has been re-
ported. 37
This contractor indifference might be explained by the un-
certainty of the rewards. When the contractor acquires rights
in a research and development contract, he has no idea what
the patent potential of the contract is-i.e., the number of pat-
ents the contract will ultimately yield, the value of any patents
actually resulting from the contract, or the date on which he can
expect any benefits to be realized.3 Probably more important
is the fact that NASA retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free
license to use any device to which it waives title for government
work.39 This means that in bidding for future government con-
tracts the patent has no value, since any contractor awarded
such a contract can use the device without applying for a license
or paying royalties. 40  On the other hand, if a contractor does
36. WATSON & HOLMAN 163. See also Solo, supra note 34, at 41:
The strongest impression to be gotten from an examination of
the record of waived inventions is of the indifference, the gen-
eral, pervasive, the sometimes absolute indifference on the part
of the contractor to the commercial potentialities of inventions
made under government research and development contracts.
37. Of 8,065 reported inventions as of December 31, 1966, contrac-
tors petitioned for waivers on 428 items, or 5% of those available. Of
13,200 prime contracts or first or second tier subcontracts, advance
waivers were requested in 341, or 2.5% of the cases. NASA, A REvi w
or NASA's PATENT PROGRAM 28 (1967).
38. WATSON & HoLMAN 164.
39. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.107 (1967).
40. Abolishing this reserved license would not give the contractor
any less incentive because even patents which are the product of private
research and development are irrelevant to a contractor's bidding strat-
egy. The Comptroller General's construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1298 (1964)
has led government procurement agencies to disregard any possible
patent infringements in selecting among bids and proposals. Herbert
Cooper, B-135916 (Aug. 25, 1958). See generally Mossinghoff & Aflnutt,
Patent Infringement in Government Procurement: A Remedy Wifhout
a Right?, 42 No=E DAME LAW. 5 (1966). If the decision of the Comp-
troller General in Herbert Cooper were reversed, then it is arguable
that the government retained license should also be abolished. This
would give an innovating contractor an additional incentive to report
by insuring that he will be the only one able to use this innovation in
19681
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not report his innovations he can reveal them in later bids and
proposals as being useful in future government work. In this
way failure to report may give him an advantage over his
competitors when the next government research and develop-
ment contract is let.
Also, where a number of inventions may have arisen partly
from NASA funding and partly from research and development
sponsored by the Department of Defense, a contractor may re-
port his invention only to the Department since he can obtain
title to Department of Defense supported inventions almost as a
matter of course.41 Since projects sponsored by NASA and the
Department of Defense may overlap and even use the same tech-
nologists at different times, it is often quite difficult to deter-
mine which agency funding is primarily responsible for any
given invention. Thus, a contractor may follow his self-interest
by not reporting it to NASA and still not believe that he has
acted dishonestly or illegally.
Finally, there is no reporting requirement for any innova-
tions produced under independent or overhead research and
development funding which is responsible for a significant
number of innovations. 42
C. CONTRACTOR UTILIZATION OF WAIVED INVENTIONS
As observed in the introduction, to the extent that contract-
ors themselves commercialize inventions on which they are given
patent rights, a formal technology transfer system is bypassed
in that transfer has already been accomplished within one com-
pany. Thus the additional factor of intracompany transfer must
future government work. It is unlikely that Congress will adopt such
a position, however.
41. But see INTERNATIONAL ECONOM:C POLICY AssOCIATION, U.S.
GOVERNMENT-'FINANCED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: POLICIES AND PRAC-
TICES IN PROTECTION AND USE Or RESULTS 14, 15 (June 13, 1967).
42. See generally SHERwIN & ISENso-x, FIRST INTERIlnx REPORT ON
PROJECT -IINDSIGHT (Sunmary, June 30, 1,966; revised Oct. 13, 1966, N.
AD 642-400). "Independent research and development" or "overhead"
research and development is funded by f aderal agencies (notably the
Department of Defense and NASA) on the theory that higher commer-
cial corporate profits are not available to the space-defense contractor
to reinvest in "company" research and development, and that such in-
vestment is essential to maintain a compelitive position in the rapidly
changing technological space-defense market. Letter to the General
Accounting Office Explaining Department of Defense Policy as to Re-
search and Development (Jan. 29, 1965). Although federally reimbursed,
contractors are not required to disclose results to government agencies.
NASA PR § 9.101-7 (Nov. 1965, rev. 6).
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be weighed in determining the desirability of a liberal waiver
policy.
The overall utilization rate of inventions to which NASA
has waived title is thought to be about 11.5 per cent.43 Esti-
mated rates for federal research generally have been seven to
thirteen per cent.44 But "utilization" can be an elusive concept.
If it means the number of inventions successfully applied com-
mercially, rather than the number of inventions on which com-
mercial development has merely taken place, then only seven
inventions can be said to have been commercialized by NASA
contractors between 1959 and 1965. 45 This represents about 4.5
per cent of the number of waivers granted in that period. These
extremely low figures should be contrasted with the estimated
sixty per cent commercial utilization of patents resulting from
private research and development.4
These figures must be received with some reservation. For
one thing NASA is of relatively recent origin, and commercial
development of a device may take considerably longer than the
present duration of NASA's existence.47 Also, it is no doubt true
that government sponsored research produces innovations which
are more expensive to develop commercially than those which
are the product of private research.48 Still, NASA's rate is un-
questionably low.
It is possible that the rate would be even lower had NASA
not attempted, in its advance waiver regulations, to distinguish
between contractors having the potential to utilize their inven-
tions and those lacking such potential. Since only the former
are likely to be encouraged to report by the incentives of patent
rights and waivers and, by definition, only the former are likely
themselves to commercialize the invention, NASA requires that
43. WATSON & HOLMAN 148-49.
44. See note 4 supra.
45. Solo, supra note 34, at 34.
46. Watson, Bright & Burns, supra note 5, at 377.
47. While the development rate varies enormously depending on
the innovation, a rough guide would be 14 years or longer from concep-
tion to industrial applications. See LYNN, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RATE
OF DEVELOPMENT AND D=sION OF TECHNOLOGY IN OUR MODERN INDUS-
TRIAL SocrTY (1958); 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TECHNOLOGY, AUTO-
MATION, AND ECONOMIlC PROGRESS, TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN EcoN-
omy 1, 4 (1966); Holman, The Utilization of Government-Owned Pat-
ented Inventions, 7 IDEA 109, 130, 131 nn.22, 23 (1963); Mansfield, Diffu-
sion of Technological Change, in NSF's REvIEWS OF DATA ON RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT (1961).
48. NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND IN-
DUSTRIAL INNOVATION (1967).
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the contractor have an established nongovernmental commer-
cial position in the area of work called for by the contract
before an advance waiver is granted.4 9
Even with this limitation of "conmmercial position," advance
waivers are a very blunt instrument when compared with
waivers on particular inventions. When waivers are granted
only on particular inventions some assessment can be made of
an individual contractor's ability to develop that invention.
However, this kind of judgment is impossible for advance waiv-
ers because one cannot predict what inventions may originate
as byproducts of any given research and development. Many
inventions to which contractors retain title under advance waiver
probably do not relate in any meaningful way to the contractor's
"established commercial position."
Not only is the "established commercial position" distinction
nearly meaningless when applied to advance waivers, but the
distinction taken by itself is not a very useful one, since the
term "established commercial position" is very difficult to de-
fine. Taken literally, one supposes that General Electric, Gen-
eral Motors, and other industrial giants will be able to show an
established commercial position in many fields, whereas smaller
companies may not. But the large corporations, and the large
aerospace corporations in particular, appear to show a very low
utilization rate, whereas smaller companies appear to commer-
cialize the technology developed under federal funding more
readily. The aerospace divisions of large diversified corpora-
tions and aerospace companies act similarly when it comes to
utilization of NASA inventions, in that there appears to be very
little intracompany transfer between the military-space divisions
and their commercial counterparts.5 '3 Consequently, although
aerospace companies and aerospace divisions of large corporations
received over ninety per cent of the prime contracts with
NASA,5 1 by January 1, 1966, they had obtained waivers on only
ninety-seven inventions, compared to the fifty-two waived inven-
49. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.104(a) (6) (1967).
50. PECK & SCHERER, THE WEAPONS AcQUISITIONS PROCESS-AN Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS 128-37 (1962). Aside from possible physical isolation
of the various divisions, the managers o large aerospace divisions or
subsidiaries act as "profit centers" in that maximum personal advance-
ment comes from division or subsidiary profits, not from reporting new
innovations to other divisions or subsidiaries of the same company.
51. NASA-supplied data indicates that over 90% of the research
and development funding in fiscal 1965 was given to corporations listed
among the 500 largest by Fortune, and most of these were among the
100 largest.
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tions held by smaller companies.5 2 More importantly, of these
ninety-seven inventions only nine are in commercial use, or about
nine per cent. An equal number of innovations is being commer-
cially used by small companies, which is about seventeen per
cent of waivers held by these companies.53 While the numbers
are small, they substantiate to some extent the thesis that greater
commercialization is undertaken by smaller companies. Further
substantiation is provided by several studies which have shown
that smaller companies tend to be more innovative generally
5 4
and, in particular, tend to have less difficulty than do large
aerospace contractors in transferring space-defense technology to
their civilian operations. 5r
Therefore, the regulations should distinguish between com-
panies with demonstrated commercialization capability, including
a genuine intent to commercialize, and those without such ca-
pability or intent. There is no need to provide explicitly that
small companies should be given a preference. Rather, if the
above thesis is correct, the smaller contractors will automatically
receive a larger number of waivers simply because they appear
to be more innovative and more successful in commercializing
space-defense technology. Finally, the distinction is reasonable
only when applied to waivers on individual inventions. Ad-
vance waivers must be abolished if the regulations adopt such a
distinction.
An aid to making such a distinction would be the place-
ment of Technology Utilization personnel in positions to advise
on or actually render the initial decisions on applications for
waivers. The petitions for waiver are currently processed
through the NASA Inventions Contributions Board, which, since
52. WATSON & HOLMAN 150.
53. Id.
54. HAmBERG, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ESSAYS ON THE Eco-
NOMICS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT pts. 1-3 (1963); Mansfield, Tech-
nical Change and the Rate of Imitation, EcONOMETRIcS 29 (1961); Mans-
field, Size of Firm, Market Structure, and Innovation, 71 POL. EcoN. 560
(1963).
55. ROBERTS & WAINER, THE NEW ENTREPRENEURS (a forthcoming
book by two MIT professors on MIT spin-off firms); Shimshoni, Aspects
of Scientific Entrepreneurship, May 1966 (Doctoral Thesis, Harvard
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences). The spin-off firms studied
by Roberts, Wainer, and Shimshoni reported 40% of their sales were
in the commercial market after 5 years, as compared with little or no
commercialization of space-defense technology by the large space-de-
fense contractors. But U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
DEFENSE INDusTRY DIVERSIrIcATION (1966) argues that some large aero-
space firms have been moderately successful at transferring their space-
defense developed technology to commercial operations.
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the personnel of the Board have little contact with the com-
panies applying for waivers, is unlikely to have the necessary
expertise to determine whether a contractor has a genuine
intent to commercialize.
Technology Utilization personnel would bring to the waiver
decision process more knowledge of company utilization and
more experience with particular companies; they would also add
a "technology transfer outlook" to the processing of waivers
which Board members are not likely to have. With such per-
sonnel in almost continual contact with most NASA contractors
and with their interest in promoting commercialization, it is
likely that they would be in an excellent position to make an
initial assessment of the petition, subject to review by the In-
ventions Contributions Board.
D. WAIVERS AS A BARRIER TO COIV ECIALIZATION BY OTHERS
While a liberal waiver policy does not seem to encourage
reporting or direct commercialization by the innovating con-
tractor,56 it does have a negative impact on the output function.
Whenever NASA waives its right to an invention, the result-
ing patent remains with the innovating contractor and neces-
sarily discourages others from using or developing the device.
NASA has taken several steps to minimize this obstruction in
the transfer system. The first is the decision of NASA to grant
advance waivers only to firms showing an established commer-
cial position. This increases the number of inventions available
for use by non-NASA contractors. Furthermore, if the distinc-
tion, which was recommended previcusly, is drawn so that waiv-
56. Nor does a liberal waiver policy seem to provide the basis for
another justification often advanced in its favor, namely, that by waiv-
ing rights the "best" contractors will be obtained by the government
or that contractors will be encouraged to assign more creative person-
nel for government sponsored work. While examination of these justi-
fications is beyond the scope of this Article, there is no evidence that
the AEC or NASA obtains lesser efforts from contractors than does the
Department of Defense. See Hearings on Patent Policies of Govern-
ment Departments and Agencies Before the Senate Subcomm. on Monop-
oly of the Select Comm. on Small Business, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960);
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm.
on Small Business, The Effect of Government Patent Policies on Compe-
tition, Monopoly, Economic Growth and Small Business, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, 6 (1962). But see STAFF OF HOUSE COmm. ON SCIENCE AND AsTRo-
NAUTIcS, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS.; OWNERSIP OF INVENTIONS DEVELOPED IN
THE COURsE OF FEDERAL SPACE RESEARcH CONTRAcTS 11, 12-27, (Comm.
Print 1962); WATSON & HoLm- v 142-88; but see Holst, Government Pat-
ent Policy-Its Impact on Contractor Cooperation and Widespread Use
of Government Sponsored Technology, 9 IDEA 273, 274 (1965).
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ers are granted only to firms with demonstrated capacity and
intent to utilize particular innovations, then the obstruction to
transfer represented by waivers would be removed.
Secondly, NASA has attempted to minimize this obstruction
by attaching a number of conditions to its waivers in the form
of "march-in" rights, which provide that the innovating con-
tractor's title will revert to NASA if: the invention is not
brought "to the point of practical application" within three years
of the granting of a United States patent; the patent is needed
for public health; or the contractor has refused to license any
responsible applicant, either royalty-free or at reasonable roy-
alties, more than three years after he has obtained a United
States patent.5 7
NASA has revoked twenty-three waivers on single inven-
tions,5 8 but has not divested a contractor of title to any inven-
tion held under an advance waiver. Since it has been barely
three years since these regulations were adopted, this low revo-
cation rate, as compared to the very high nonutilization rate, is
perhaps not too unreasonable. However, it appears unlikely that
NASA will expend the necessary resources to keep track of the
state of development of all its waived inventions, and it seems
even more improbable that NASA will be inclined to disrupt
harmonious contractor relationships with many revocations.59
These provisions will probably be invoked, if at all, only at the
urging of a third party interested in the device.
A related question is what happens to the license granted
the inventor-contractor should his patent rights be revoked.
NASA regulations describe such licenses as being "irrevoca-
ble."' 0  The Patent Council's Office interprets this as meaning
that even if the patent is revoked, the contractor still retains
his royalty-free, nonexclusive license. Such an interpretation
57. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.108 (1967).
58. As of Jan. 1, 1967 there were 267 waivers granted on individual
inventions; therefore, revocation of 23 of them is about 9% of the total.
There were also, as of Jan. 1, 1967, 53 inventions held under advance
waivers. If these are included, NASA revocations represent about 7%
of waived inventions. NASA, A REviEw oF NASA's PATENT PROGAm 28
(1967).
59. President Eisenhower observed that it appeared that the in-
terests of the government agencies and the space-defense industries
were closely allied. Address from the White House (Jan. 19, 1961).
But see ScBERER, THE WEAPONS AcQuisrrloNs PROCESS 114-17 (1964), in
regard to the Army's efforts to force Douglas Aircraft to disclose com-
pany know-how for use in "break-out" of Honest John missile produc-
tion.
60. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.113 (1967).
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presents an unnecessary barrier -to utilization of the device,
since NASA may later wish to grant an exclusive license to a
third party as an incentive to commercialize the innovation. If
the contractor has retained his nonexclusive license, the "ex-
clusive" commercial rights granted to the third party are not
really exclusive, and the latter will know that if he develops
the device and makes it successful, another may take advantage
of his development work. Furthermore, this license may under-
cut the contractor's incentive to commercialize since he knows
that even if he fails to put forth his best efforts, he retains a
potentially valuable nuisance interest.
If NASA ceased to grant these licenses automatically to in-
venting contractors, the advantage to the output side could ar-
guably be overbalanced by the disadvantage to the input side
in the form of a reduced incentive to report. However, if NASA
makes it clear that any inventing contractor who can show com-
mercial interest and potential for any one of his inventions may
obtain a waiver thereto, then the unavailability of the license
should make little difference. A contractor is encouraged to re-
port by the present license policy only if he himself wants to
utilize the device commercially. If he can obtain the patent in
that case, he has no need of the license.
But since NASA patent policy exists in an industrial milieu
created and dominated by the Department of Defense, it is un-
likely that more than marginal improvement in contractor re-
porting rates can be expected unless the Defense Department also
adopts a policy of selective grant of title to contractors based on
their intent to commercialize. Nevertheless, NASA as the
leader among federal agencies in promoting technology transfer
appears to have an implied duty to formulate and administer a
policy designed to maximize transfer within its present opera-
tional context.
E. ALTERNATIVE INCENTIVES To REPORT
If advance waivers are abolished, irrevocable licenses ter-
minated, and regular waivers administered so as to allow title to
vest in innovating contractors only where they can demonstrate
commercial potential, the incentive for contractors to report
will be only slightly less than at present. 61 Presently, patent
rights act as an incentive to report only where commercial
rights are important, and it is in just those situations that the
61. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
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above recommendations would allow a waiver of those rights.
However, as previously indicated, a liberal waiver policy and
the contractual penalties imposed by the New Technology Clause
have been ineffective in promoting reporting. Therefore, some
other means will have to be used to encourage contractor dis-
closure. Although a comprehensive examination of this topic is
beyond the scope of this Article, a brief mention of several pos-
sible approaches, as yet untried or only partially tried, will be
made.
NASA could institute a program of payments to reward con-
tractors' employees for discovering and reporting useful innova-
tions. Thus far, NASA has not initiated such a program with
any of its contractors, although authority to do so exists under
section 306 of the Space Act.0 2 However, NASA has maintained
an award system for its own employees, whose disclosure rate
is much higher than that of contractors' employees. 63
A related suggestion is that NASA seek to channel reports
directly from contractors' employees to the NASA Technology
Utilization Program, thus bypassing company channels. Al-
though individual inventors are already motivated to disclose
inventions to enhance their professional prestige, the recognition
by higher administrative officials in the company, including pat-
ent counsel, of the company's interest not to disclose whatever
can successfully be hidden acts as a barrier to disclosure.64 A
direct channel from the employee-inventor to NASA would elim-
inate this barrier.
NASA could also keep track of the rates of disclosure for
its various contractors. Current records show that the rates
vary much more than can be justified entirely by differing
types of research and development work.65 By keeping such
records, and referring to them when a contractor seeks a new
government project, some incentive to report could perhaps be
created.
Finally, NASA could make payments to its contractors to
enable them to initiate intracompany technology utilization pro-
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2458 (1964). This possibility was studied for NASA.
Ebenstein, NASA Inventions and Contributions Awards Program, Aug.
19, 1966 (internal NASA memo). NASA has very recently issued regu-
lations indicating the award program has been extended to contractor
employees, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,262 (1967), although actual implementation
appears to be moving slowly.
63. See note 34 supra.
64. Solo, supra note 34, pt. 3, at 9.
65. Id. pt. 2, at 16.
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grams. Presumably this would involve the assignment of sev-
eral company engineers to monitor the research of other em-
ployees for reportable items. NASA has funded one such pro-
gram with its largest contractor, North American Aviation.00
The rate of reporting for North American went up by a factor of
eight in the first year after payment, although the quality of
these disclosures may not have increased.0 7
III. PATENT POLICY AND THE OUTPUT FUNCTION
A. NASA LICENSE POLICY
A major effect of an agency's patent policy on the output
function has already been noted-a liberal waiver policy with-
out significant contractor commercialization acts as a clog on the
dissemination and use of the technology by others. Patent
policy can affect the output function in a positive manner as
well, provided title to innovations is not waived. Licensing with-
out royalties, or even in some cases exclusive licensing, may
act as an incentive for third parties to commercialize government
developed technology.
NASA describes its license policy as follows:
[NASA] regulations provide for broad royalty-free, non-exclu-
sive licensing during the first two years after a patent is issued
to NASA. After the two year period, if the benefits of the
inventions have not been brought to the public, NASA will
grant an exclusive license to exploit the invention. If, how-
ever, the invention has been commercially worked during the
two years, the patent will continue to be available on a non-
exclusive basis. This licensing policy differs from that of other
government agencies in that in cases where utilization will thus
be made possible, the granting of exclusive licenses will be
used as an incentive to commercial working of dormant govern-
ment owned patents .... 68
This statement is somewhat misleading in that the license
denoted as "exclusive" has a number of significant limitations
66. From interviews with NASA Technology Utilization personnel
during the late summer of 1966, it appears that North American Avia-
tion was given $500,000 for 9 months to establish a trial new technology
reporting function. North American Aviation, Inc. Technology Utiliza-
tion Program Management and Operation Plan, Sept. 29, 1965 (report
submitted to the NASA TUP). The fir;t official NASA directive allow-
ing specific funding for New Technology Reporting was issued in March,
1966. NASA Procurement Regulation Directive No. 66-5, II, at 2-3
(March 1966).
67. Although the rate of reported items increased greatly, several
Technology Utilization personnel felt that most of the increased num-
ber of disclosures were of "little value" for the purposes of the Tech-
nology Utilization Program.
68. NASA, A REvmw OF NASA's PATENT POLICY 32 (1966).
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attaching to it. If the originating party was a NASA contractor,
this license is subject to an irrevocable, royalty-free, nonexclu-
sive license in him.69 The term of the limited exclusive license
is not necessarily co-extensive with that of the patent, but is a
negotiable item between the applicant and the Administrator.70
The regulations also provide for "march-in" rights, under which
the Administrator may revoke the license if the licensee fails to
use "his continuing best efforts to work the invention. '7 1 "Best
efforts" are to be defined in the negotiations between the appli-
cant and NASA. This limited exclusive license is also subject
to a royalty-free, nontransferable right to practice the inven-
tion by or on behalf of the government.7 2 Finally, the license
is nontransferable, except to a successor in interest of the
licensee.73
B. NASA LICENSE POLICY AS A SPUR TO UTILIZATION
Although NASA's grant of a limited exclusive license could
offer a significant incentive to industry to commercialize certain
of NASA's inventions, the visible effects of this policy on the out-
put function have been something less than spectacular. As of
January 1, 1967, NASA had title to 488 patents, with about 746
pending.74 Of that number, only 365 patents and 509 applica-
tions were listed as available for licensing.75 NASA had
granted eighty nonexclusive licenses on thirty-six different pat-
ents, forty-three nonexclusive "licenses" on nineteen patent ap-
plications, and two exclusive licenses, one of which has since
been terminated because the licensee could not justify additional
development costs. 76 This means that about ten per cent of
NASA-held available patents were licensed in 1966. 77 Of these,
about eleven per cent were in commercial use.78 Thus, assuming
minimal use by nonlicensees,79 about one per cent of NASA-held
69. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.113 (1967).
70. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.205 (c) (3) (1967).
71. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.205 (c) (6) (1967).
72. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.205 (c) (4) (1967).
73. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.205 (c) (5) (1967).
74. NASA, A REVIEW OF NASA's PATMT PROGRAM 13 (1967). These
figures may be overstated. Watson and Holman found the official 1965
NASA published figures to differ considerably from those they obtained
through interviews. See WATSON & HOLMAN 69.
75. NASA, supra note 74, at 29.
76. Id.
77. Cf. WATsoN & HoMAN 68.
78. Cf. id. at 68-101.
79. The assumption is quite reasonable (despite widespread know-
ledge that the government will not enforce its patents against nonli-
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patents have been successfully commercialized.
With only one exclusive license outstanding, comparisons
between exclusive and nonexclusive licenses would be meaning-
less. Still, it seems reasonable to speculate that the added in-
centive of exclusive commercial rights would encourage faster
development. Admittedly, the patent incentive to commercialize
the device provided by an exclusive license is no greater than
that offered a contractor to whom title to the patent has been
waived. The difference is that exclusive licensees can be se-
lected from companies more likely to commercialize-those with
a proven record of success in the commercial market for the
given class of invention or who are able to demonstrate a clear
intent to enter the given commercial market.8 0 Moreover, com-
panies can be selected on the basis of their interest in a par-
ticular device instead of being granted advance waivers on what-
ever inventions may turn up. Thus, the granting of advance
waivers ought to be discontinued, and emphasis placed more on
exclusive licensing to noncontractors vis-a-vis individual waivers
for contractor-inventors.
C. ExCLUSIVE LICENSE--ALIENATION OF A NONEXISTENT RIGHT?
NASA has granted only two exclusive licenses, one of which
has been terminated, and has turned down several other requests
for exclusive licenses.8 ' This failure to fully utilize its exclusive
licensing prerogative can probably best be explained by the un-
certainty that exists as to what kinds of licenses NASA or any
other government agency is statutorily or even constitutionally
censed users) because the license costs nothing and because NASA may
well supply the licensee with supplementary information. Solo, Inven-
tion Under NASA-Sponsored Research and Development 42-43 (1966)(part II of a working paper for NASA).
80. The evidence that smaller firms will be more successful in
commercializing space-defense innovations is less impressive than that
supporting the proposition advanced earlier, that smaller firms will
utilize innovations which they themselves have produced as NASA con-
tractors. See notes 49-54 supra. A poll of subscribers to one of NASA's
Regional Dissemination Centers found a
high degree of success reported by small businessmen who sub-
scribed to the programs. All of them commented that the avail-
ability of advanced NASA research material and information is
invaluable as each of their firms is too small to maintain its
own research development department. These small business-
men constituted fully half of those 10 reporting financial gain.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Advanced Research, and Technology
of the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 4, at 646 (1966).
81. WATSON & HoLVAN 91.
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permitted to grant. There are basically three general questions
which must be answered in determining whether a government
agency such as NASA has exclusive licensing power: (1) Does
government ownership of a patent necessarily eliminate the right
to exclude others from using the device? (2) If not, does aliena-
tion of this right to exclude amount to a "disposal of property"
requiring congressional authorization? (3) If so, has Congress
delegated such authority to NASA?
1. Government's Right To Exclude
The critical question here is whether the federal government
has the constitutional authority to grant to itself the right to ex-
clude others from the practice of certain inventions. At present,
this question remains unresolved. The only case in which the
government has sought to enforce a patent is Tektronix, Inc. v.
United States.8 2 In that case the government was sued for
infringement, and counterclaimed for infringement of one of its
own patents. The Court of Claims avoided the constitutional
issue by holding that the government was estopped from en-
forcing its patents because of its century-long policy of not en-
forcing them. Absent special circumstances justifying enforce-
ment, or some kind of notice to the public that government
owned patents will be enforced, the government was held to
have impliedly licensed all users.8 3 However, a series of United
States Attorney General Opinions which more directly faced the
constitutional issue concluded that the assignment of a patent to
the government is not equivalent to a dedication to the public,
and that the government is thus able to enforce its patents.8 4
It is difficult to find any constitutional justification for the
latter conclusion. Although the Constitution gives Congress the
"power to dispose of ... property belonging to the United
82. 351 F.2d 630 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
83. Id. at 633. The court relied on Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320
(1889), where the Supreme Court held that the custom of allowing
grazing animals on government land impliedly licensed such use of
the land.
84. 39 Op. AT'Y GFN. 164 (1938); 38 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 425 (1936).
Even here, the question is merely raised and then answered by relying
on an earlier opinion by Attorney General Harlan F. Stone. 34 Op.
ATT'y GEN. 320 (1924). As discussed in text accompanying notes 93-94
infra, Stone in this earlier opinion had expressed his view that executive
departments could license government held patents revocably and non-
exclusively to private parties. The two later opinions reason that the
grant of a license makes sense only if the patent has not been dedicated
to general use, but they did not discuss the constitutional foundations
of the power they approve.
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States,"8 5 this grant does not provide much support. The ques-
tion still remains whether or not the government's ownership
of the patent necessarily removes the patent's "property" at-
tributes. In other words, the government first has to create the
property in the patent by granting a right to exclude, and it is
that power of creation which is questioned.
The Constitution also states that "Congress shall have power
... to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their writings and discoveries. 8 6  This raises the issue
of whether the United States can consider itself an "inventor"
entitled to exclusive rights. Certainly the policies of the patent
provision are not applicable to the United States as an inventor
since the government needs neither the incentive to do research
nor the incentive to disclose the results of that research thought
to be provided by the grant of a right to exclude others for
seventeen years. Nor can it be argued that the government
should be rewarded by the grant of exclusive rights to itself.
However, granting an exclusive license to nongovernmental third
parties can be an effective method "to promote the progress of
science and useful arts," particularly when these licenses may be
the only effective means to transfer government developed in-
ventions to private industry.87
Logically, it would be inconsistent to say that the govern-
ment may grant to third parties a right to exclude which it
does not itself possess, even though the policies behind the
patent power would support such a distinction. Indeed, it seems
rather clear that this distinction cannot be made, for potential
licensees are not "inventors," and the federal government has
been delegated authority to grant exclusive rights only to "in-
ventors." The granting of such rights to noninventors would be
the utilization of monopoly power by the sovereign so disliked
by the framers when they passed the limited patent power.8 8
85. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
87. Earlier critics of government patent ownership failed to foresee
this beneficial use of the power to exclude, because it did not occur
to them that the government would be engaged in transferring tech-
nology. See. Ewing, Government Owned Patents, 10 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y
149 (1928); Wille, Government Ownership of Patents, 12 FoRDELAM L.
R.v. 105 (1943).
88. One cannot be certain what the framers had in mind because
the patent power seems to have provoked little or no debate. See
Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Consti-
tution, 17 Gno. L.J. 109 (1929). However, it does seem clear that the
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Since the most desirable policy distinction-i.e., allowing
the government to grant the right to exclude even though it
cannot exercise the right itself--cannot logically be recognized,
the patent provision should be construed to include the United
States as an "inventor." So long as the opinion in Tektronix
is upheld, this distinction can in fact be drawn. Since the gov-
ernment possesses the power to exclude, it may grant the power
to third parties but is estopped from using the power itself by
long usage.8 9
2. Disposal of Property
If one assumes that exclusive licenses on government pat-
ents are constitutionally permissible, the related question of to
whom the authority to grant them is delegated-the Congress
or each executive department-arises. If conveying the right to
exclude amounts to a disposal of property, then Congress must
have this power.9 0 It might be argued that the true value of
a patent to the government lies in its defensive capabilities, in
that it protects the government from infringement actions by
other inventors holding similar patents. The long-standing pol-
icy of the government never to enforce its patents reinforces
this conceptualization. Hence, the argument continues, so long
as an agency retains sufficient control over the licensee to ensure
that the government owned patent is employed in furtherance
of a legitimate agency program, the issuance of a limited ex-
clusive license is a proper use or exercise of government prop-
erty rights rather than an unauthorized disposal of these rights.91
However, it is difficult to understand just what remains of the
property rights inherent in a patent absent the power to exclude.
There is only the right to practice the invention immune from
original proposal was always in its limited form. See 2 M. FERRAND,
RECORDS or = FEDFRAL CoNvENrioN or 1787, at 321-22 (1911), where
the provisions in question are first introduced.
89. The result under this approach is not quite the same as under
approaches which deny totally the government's right to exclude since
Congress or the executive could revoke the implied license by giving
public notice and recover the right to exclude. A related problem is
whether the granting of an exclusive license gives the public the kind
of notice required by the Tektronix rationale. See Berger, Utilization
or Dispensation--Suggestions for the Government's Patent Procurement
Program, 48 J. PAT. Orr. Soc'y 449, 460 (1966).
90. See note 85 supra.
91. While some authority to use government property in executing
the laws might well be implied in art. II, Congress has explicitly
confirmed such authority to the head of each department over "custody,
use, and preservation of its... property." 5 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. 1966).
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infringement suits by others, which could as easily be afforded
by publication as by patent.9 2 Clearly, if the government pub-
lished rather than patented its invention, there would be no
"property" created, other than a copyright granted by a separate
statute. Hence, unless patents are not to be considered "prop-
erty" at all, alienation of the right to exclude must be a dis-
posal of property.
In considering the power to grant revocable, nonexclusive
licenses, the leading treatment of executive power to dispose of
government patent rights,93 implicilly assumes, first, that the
federal government does have the power to exclude, and second,
that disposal of all patent rights would be a disposal of property
requiring explicit congressional authorization. Proceeding from
there, the author sets out a number of distinctions, one being
that a nonexclusive license
does not dispose . . . of the patent monopoly .... The pat-
entee still retains all the elements or characteristics of the
property or monopoly. He can still assign, sell, exclude others
from making, using, or selling, and can sue for infringement-
and these are al the rights which a patent confers.94
The initial statement is not precisely accurate because each
nonexclusive license does reduce the patent monopoly and,
given a finite number of potential users, a number of such licen-
ses could eventually completely erode the monopoly. However,
the distinction can nonetheless be made and, if it is, exclusive
licensing is a disposition of property whereas nonexclusive li-
censing is not.
3. Delegation of Congressional Authority to NASA
Assuming that congressional authorization is necessary, it
is questionable whether or not NASA has been given the neces-
sary power to license exclusively. Section 305(a) of the Space
Act grants very broad authority to the Administrator to "de-
termine... the terms and conditions upon which licenses will
be granted. .... ,95 It might be urged either that this vague
92. Publication does not afford exactly the same immunity from
future infringement suits that a patent does. See Solo, supra note 79, at
28-32; Berger, supra note 89, at 461.
93. 34 Op. ATT'Y GFN. 320, 329 (1924).
94. Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2457 (g) (1964). Section 203 (b) (3) provides that
the Administrator "may sell and otherwise dispose of real and personal
property (including patents and rights thereunder)... ." 42 U.S.C. §
2473 (1964). However, this section is specifically tied to property as
defined under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of
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language confers the necessary authority on NASA, or that long-
standing congressional acquiescence in various executive de-
partments' license policies has delegated sufficient authority to
NASA as well as to the other agencies.96 However, it appears
that the Tennessee Valley Authority is the only agency which
has ever licensed any of its patents exclusively.9 7 Hence, any
congressional acquiescence cannot necessarily be said to extend
to exclusive licensing. Similarly, had Congress intended to alter
so radically the prevailing government licensing practice by
means of section 305, this would probably have been stated ex-
plicitly, since "it is clearly the intent of Congress that basic
guidelines of government patent policy should be determined
by Congress."98
Therefore, since NASA justifiably appears skeptical of its
authority to grant exclusive licenses, clear statutory authoriza-
tion should be given. This would probably induce NASA to
grant more licenses and perhaps significantly increase the utili-
zation rate.
D. ExcLusIVE LIcENSING AS A BARuER To USE BY OTHERS
Just as granting a contractor exclusive commercial rights
prevents others from using innovations, the grant of an exclusive
license may prevent the widest possible use of technical in-
formation. NASA has taken two steps to minimize this bar to
dissemination of such information.
1949, 49 U.S.C. § 471 (1964). This Act is limited to "excess property"-
i.e., not needed for discharge of an agency's responsibilities and requires
approval of the GSA Administrator before the property may be disposed
of as "surplus." 40 U.S.C. § 472 (g) (1964). In view of the declaration
in President Kennedy's patent statement that government owned in-
ventions constitute a "valuable" national resource, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,942
(1963), such a determination that patent rights constitute "excess
property" or surplus would be inappropriate.
96. Cf. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
97. The Tennessee Valley Authority's statutory mandate to dispose
of patent rights is at least as vague as NASA's in that it is authorized
to grant such licenses thereunder under its patents, as shall be author-
ized by the Board. 16 U.S.C. § 831 (d) (i) (1964).
The Authority has granted one exclusive license for a term of five
years to a private firm and five such licenses to employee inventors.
No test of Board authority has ever arisen, and the Authority has ap-
parently decided not to issue any other exclusive licenses. STAFF OF
THE SuBcomivi. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AD COPYRIGHTS, OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON =H JuDIcIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., PATENT PRACTICES OF THE
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHoRITY 199, 210 (Comm. Print 1959).
98. Statement of Senator McClellan, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. of the Ju-
diciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1965).
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As noted earlier,99 present NASA policy is to make patents
available to all potential users on a nonexclusive, royalty-
free basis; if, after two years, no one has "worked" the device,
then it is available for exclusive licensing.100 Clearly, the ra-
tionale behind the regulation is that the greatest possible com-
mercial use provides the most desirable results. This goal can
be achieved if the device is attractive enough to be developed
without the incentive of an exclusive license, but if the device
is not so alluring, then the less desirable alternative of offering
exclusive rights is to be explored. The two-year waiting period,
given an effective information dissemination program so that
potential developers can learn of the device, is NASA's measure-
ment of the appeal of its innovations.
While the rationale of the regulation is sound, the adoption
of two suggestions would facilitate the realization of its goal.
First, although the idea that the passage of a period of time is an
adequate measure of the commercial potential of innovations is
administratively workable, it provides a somewhat crude stand-
ard. But the alternative of evaluating each invention for its
commercial potential is not much more attractive. However, if
the waiting period were made discretionary rather than manda-
tory, NASA personnel could grant exclusive licenses without
waiting two years in certain instances, such as where there is
only one applicant and he refuses to apply for a nonexclusive
license, or where the nature of the device clearly indicates that
a two-year wait would lessen the worth of an exclusive license.
The official two-year period could also be shortened to one
year. The actual waiting period is a minimum of two years and
three months plus the delay caused by the Inventions Contribu-
tions Board passing on the license application.10 1 With a one-
year period, the Board could begin its processing of an appli-
cation on the condition that it would be rejected if an appli-
cation for a nonexclusive license were received.
NASA's "march-in" rights-the right to revoke the license if
the invention is not diligently worked.-are also designed to mini-
mize the bar to dissemination represented by an exclusive li-
cense.10 2 As in the waiver situation, 03 the enforcement of such
99. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
100. 14 C.F.R. § 1245.205 (c) (1) & (2) (1967).
101. No data is available on the time required for the Inventions
Contributions Board to process applications for exclusive licenses, but
a rough estimate is about eleven months, since that is the time required
to process a waiver petition through the Board. WATSON & HOLMAN 195.
102. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
103. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
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rights creates an administrative problem, although thus far,
keeping track of the one outstanding exclusive license probably
has not taxed NASA greatly. However, should more such li-
censes be granted, as recommended above, NASA would have
to devise an administrative system for monitoring the commer-
cial development of many devices. Assigning this monitoring
task to the one body within NASA with a real interest in pro-
moting commercialization, the Office of Technology Utilization,
would materially assist in evaluating compliance with the con-
tract terms. Moreover, its continuing contact with industrial
clients should provide the expertise to properly evaluate con-
tract compliance.
IV. CONCLUSION
NASA's patent policy places more emphasis on attempting
to encourage the reporting of inventions than on fostering the
utilization of such inventions by other segments of the economy.
However, both advance waivers and irrevocable, nonexclusive li-
censes, two of the principal means used to induce reporting, have
proven ineffective in stimulating the input function of NASA's
Technology Utilization Program. Initially, it is arguable that ad-
vance waivers have not been authorized by Congress. Secondly,
and more importantly, waiver of patent title is valueless unless
the contractor intends to commercialize the invention. Irrevoc-
able licenses should not be granted since they provide little in-
centive to report and act as an impediment to commercialization.
by others. Advance waivers should be abolished, and waivers on
individual inventions should be granted only where NASA's tech-
nology personnel determine that the contractor has the requi-
site commercial position or an intent to commercialize the inno-
vation in question. In addition, alternative and more effective
reporting incentives should be implemented to lessen the dele-
terious effects of the present patent policy on the output func-
tion.
NASA's patent policy would be a much more effective com-
ponent of the Technology Transfer Program if it placed greater
emphasis on the output function. Retraction of the present lib-
eral waiver policy would remove one of the obstacles to dissemi-
nation, as would a more liberal use of exclusive licenses. How-
ever, since exclusive licenses can also operate as a partial bar to
dissemination, there must be some reasonable limitations on the
issuance of such licenses. A nonexclusive license could be
granted for one year, with a provision for convertibility to an ex-
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clusive license if no one else had worked the device during that
period. In addition, Technology Utilization personnel should
have the authority to waive the one-year waiting period in ap-
propriate instances. Technology Utilization personnel should
also monitor work being done by exclusive licensees, so that
NASA can utilize its "march-in" rights where necessary. Fi-
nally, since NASA is justifiably uncertain of its right to grant
exclusive licenses, Congress should provide it with explicit statu-
tory authorization.
Although patent policy is not the most important variable in
the process of technology transfer, i should nevertheless be re-
vised so as to be as consistent with .ASA's Technology Utiliza-
tion Program as possible. Moreover, it is one area in which the
effects of policy changes can be measured so that some check can
be provided on the functioning of a technology transfer program.
In addition, since NASA has taken the lead in developing a com-
prehensive technology transfer program, a better coordinated
patent policy may serve succeeding agency programs as a more
workable model.
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